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Abstract
This note exploits an alternative but simple way to examine the employment effect of wage
discrimination when the constant elasticity labor supply curves are strictly concave. The
Bernoulli inequality applied in this paper allows us to show that wage discrimination
increases total employment in a relative simple way, without resorting to complicated
manipulations as were used by Formby, Layson and Smith (1983) and Shieh (2001).
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1. Introduction
Formby, Layson and Smith (henceforth FLS) in their well-known 1983 paper utilized
Lagrangean techniques to examine the output effect of monopolistic third degree price
discrimination under constant demand elasticity conditions. They also examined the
employment effect of monopsonistic third degree wage discrimination under constant
labor supply elasticity conditions. Recently, in this journal, Aguirre (2006) provided a
much simple approach, the Bernoulli inequality, to show FLS’s result that monopolistic
price discrimination increases total output under constant demand elasticity if the demand
curves are strictly concave. However, Aguirre didn’t consider the impact of wage
discrimination on total employment. It would be interesting and important to apply the
Bernoulli inequality to investigate the employment effect of wage discrimination.
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. We will set up a monopsony model with n
labor markets and examine the effect of wage discrimination on total employment by
using the Bernoulli inequality. It will be shown that monopsonistic wage discrimination
increases total employment if the labor supply curves belong to the class of strictly
concave and constant elasticity.
2. Analysis
Consider a monopsonistic firm which uses a single input, labor, to produce a product that
was sold in a perfectly competitive market, e.g., FLS (1982, 1983) and Sandmo (1994).
Assume also that the firm hires workers from all n segregated markets. The labor supply
function in market i (i = 1, 2, 3,..., n) has constant elasticity and is given by Li(wi) =
aiwie i where wi = wage rate, ei = constant elasticity, ai > 0 and ei > 1. If the third degree
wage discrimination is allowed, the firm’s problem in market i is: max πi = pq – wiLi
where q = f(L) = ΣLi, p is determined at the perfectly competitive product market
n
ΣLi = L (total employment) and Σ ≡ Σ . For simplicity, we drop the index throughout the
i=1
paper. It should be noted that the perfectly competitive output market and the fixed
coefficient production function assumptions are not too restrictive. Ekelund, Higgins and
Smithson pointed out that marginal revenue product is independent of monopsony’s
ability to discriminate, (1981, 665). FLS maintained that “the slope of MRP curve is
directly pertinent only to the magnitude of the employment change but not to the
direction of that change.” (1982, footnote 1, 551). Shieh (1995) showed Ekelund,
Higgins and Smithson’s (1981) and FLS’s (1982) assertion mathematically.
Following Boal and Ransom (1997, p. 87), via the first order condition, we obtain the
Pigou index in market i is inversely proportional to ei, i.e.,
[(p – wi*)/wi*] = (1/ei), i = 1, 2, 3, …, n

(1)

Solving (1), we obtain the optimal wage in market i
wi* = p/[1 + (1/ei)], i = 1, 2, 3, …, n

(2)
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Thus, the monopsonistic firm will offer a higher wage in the market with the higher
elasticity of labor supply. The employment in market i will be
Li* = ai[pei/(1 + ei)]e i , i = 1, 2, 3, …, n

(3)

and total employment under wage discrimination would be
L* = ΣLi* = Σ ai[pei/(1 + ei)]e i

(4)

Under simple monopsony, the firm’s problem is: max π = pL – wL. Via the first order
condition, the Pigou index is
[(p – wo)/wo] = [1/e(wo)]

(5)

where e(wo) = the elasticity of the aggregate supply of labor at wo. Since L = Σ Li, the
weighted average of the elasticities of individual markets, e(wo), can be written as:
e(wo) = [Σ Li’(wo)][wo/ΣLi(wo)] = Σeiai(wo)e i /Σai(wo)e i = Σωi(wo)ei

(6)

where Li’(wo) is dL(w)/dw at w = wo and ωi(wo) = Li(wo)/ ΣLi(wo) is the share of market i
in total employment at the optimal uniform wage (wo). For convenience and without loss
of generality, following FLS (1983), we assume that the units of employment (L) are
defined so that wo = 1 and p = 1+ (1/e). With this convention, (6) can be rewritten as:
e(1) = Σeiai/Σai

(7)

Substituting (7) into p = 1 + [1/e(1)], we obtain
p = Σai(1 + ei)/ Σaiei

(8)

Further, we can obtain employment in market i, Lio = ai and total employment Lo = ΣLio =
Σai.
The effect of wage discrimination on total employment can be obtained by comparing
L* and Lo. If L* > Lo, we can conclude that wage discrimination increases total
employment. Following Aguirre (2006) and Galera and Zaratiegui (2006), we will use
the Bernoulli inequality to show that L* > Lo. According to the Bernoulli inequality, “ if
– 1 < x ≠ 0 and a >1 are real values, then (1 + x)a > 1 + ax”, Mitrinovic (1970, p. 34). Let
(1 + x) = wi* = [pei/(1 + ei)] and a = ei > 1. The Bernoulli inequality implies that
[pei/(1 + ei)]e i > 1 + ei{[pei/(1 + ei)] – 1}

(9)

Given (8) we have
[pei/(1 + ei)] – 1 = (eiΣai -Σaiei)/(1+ei)Σaiei
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(10)

Substituting (10) into (9), we obtain
[pei/(1 + ei)]e i > 1 + ei[(eiΣai -Σaiei)/(1+ei)Σaiei]

(11)

Multiplying both side of (11) by ai and then summing i from 1 to n, we obtain
L* =ΣLi* = Σai[pei/(1 + ei)]e i > Lo + Σaiei[(eiΣai -Σaiei)/(1+ei)Σaiei]

(12)

where Lo = Σai . It is clear that L* > Lo if the last term in (12) is non-negative, i.e.,
Σ{[aiei/(1 + ei)](eiΣai -Σaiei)}/Σaiei] = (1/Σaiei){Σ[aiei2/(1 + ei)]Σai
- Σ[aiei/(1 + ei)] Σaiei)} > 0

(13)

Since (Σaiei) > 0, we have to check whether A = {Σ[aiei2/(1 + ei)]Σai - Σ[aiei/(1 + ei)]
Σaiei)}, i = 1, 2, 3,…, n is non-negative or not.
By using the mathematical induction method, we first obtain
A(n = 2) = [1/(1 + e1)(1 + e2)]a1a2(e1 – e2)2 > 0

(14)

Next, we have
A(n + 1) = A(n) + an+1{Σ[ai(ei – en+1)2/(1 + en+1)(1 + ei)]}

(15)

Since the last term in (15) is positive, it is easy to see that if A(n) > 0 then A(n + 1) > 0.
This shows that the sign of A is positive for any n ≥ 2. Thus L* > Lo, i.e., wage
discrimination increases total employment if the labor supply curves belong to the class
of strictly concave and constant labor supply elasticity. This result is consistent with FLS
(1983, p. 896 and p. 898) and Shieh (2001, p. 186).
3. Concluding remarks
We have attempted to exploit an alternative but much simple way to examine the effect
of wage discrimination on total employment. Following Aguirre (2006) and Galera and
Zaratiegui (2006), we utilize the Bernoulli inequality to show that the wage
discrimination always increases total employment if the labor supply curves are strictly
concave and have constant supply elasticity. We obtain this result with a much simple
way without resorting to complicated manipulations as were used by FLS (1983) and
Shieh (2001).
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